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Anenson: Vagrancy Laws

ANOTHER CASUALTY OF THE WAR...
VAGRANCY LAWS TARGET THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION

THE TIME:
THE PLACE:

World War II
Casablanca, Morocco

Casablanca is teeming with European refugees desperate for passage to
neutral Lisbon - from there, to America.
SCENE ONE: Two German couriers have just been murdered in the desert; their
visas are missing. The alarm bell sounds and the loudspeaker commands "Round
up all suspicious characters and search them for the documents!"
In the ensuing chaos on the streets, police officials seize upon appearance,
flight, and upon the suspect's failure to answer questions. A local explains to an
American tourist, "It's the customary round up of refugees, liberals. ... "
This scene reflects an untrammeled play of police persecution, guaranteed
by our founding fathers to never reach the shores of America. As Justice
Douglas so assuredly wrote: "We do not permit the practice engaged in in some
other lands of allowing arrests on suspicion or at the caprice of the police" I ...
the "police must make out part of their case at least before the citizen is
arrested." 2 Indeed, to allow such a practice would be "repugnant to American
institutions and ideals...,,

The reason for this protection? The Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable seizures. 4 It is an Amendment which protects a "catalog of
indispensable freedoms";5 it is an Amendment which "sets our nation apart from
much of the world." 6 But it is an amendment which may soon become our
nation's greatest casualty in its war on drugs.
Responding to the mounting public pressure in the face of our nation's drug
problem, law enforcement officials have increased their traditional detection and

'William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy And Arrest On Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1,13 (1960).
3 State ex rel Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 663 P.2d 992, 997 (Ariz. 1983) (Feldman, J., concurring).
4 See U.S. CONST., amend. IV. It guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
5 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
6 See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75
CoRNa.L L. REV. 1258, 1337 (1990).
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deterrence efforts, and have also resorted to the use of illegal seizures. 7 Congress
and state legislatures have spurred this disregard of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable seizures by enacting a rash of vagrancy laws--for example making it a crime to loiter with a purpose to engage in illegal drug
activities. 8 Court rulings have continued this trend, enlarging the government's
investigatory powers in the face of our nation's drug crisis yet failing to
acknowledge serious Fourth Amendment implications of these new vagrancy
laws. Although passing muster under the constitutional challenge of vagueness,
these laws provide a subterfuge for arrests without probable cause and result in
discriminatory enforcement. 9
This Comment will review the origins of the vagrancy law and its
traditional abuses. It will then examine decisions discussing the vagrancy law's
constitutionality under the Due Process clause void-for-vagueness doctrine and
the courts' attempted remedy of explicit standards as to place, scope, or purpose.
The remainder of this Comment will discuss the constitutionality of these revised
vagrancy laws under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
seizures.
VAGRANCY'S VOYAGE To AMERICA

Promotingthe General Welfare by Banishing the Poor
Vagrancy laws are a part of our American heritage. They began in
England in the Fourteenth Century as "the criminal aspect of the poor laws". 10
The poor laws confined the laboring class to stated areas at specified
wages." These laws were the ruling class' tool to control the labor shortages at

7 A special committee chaired by Professor Dash has found that "[some] disregard for the Fourth Amendment,
specifically in drug cases, may be an unavoidable by-product of a drug problem so pervasive that the police feel

they sometimes must violate constitutional restraints in order to regain control of the streets." Professor Dash's
committee also noted that both "legal and illegal searches and arrests for drugs have generally proven
ineffective in controlling or reducing the drug problem." ABA Criminal Justice Section, Special Comm. on
Criminal Justice in a Free Society, CRImNAL JusmcE INCRisIS 46 (1988).
8 See infra text accompanying notes 78-100.
9 Maclin, supra note, at 1333-34. ("Stemming the flow of illegal narcotics is the driving force behind many
cases involving police-citizen encounters, and behind much of the [Supreme] Court's fourth amendment
jurisprudence in general."); See Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause,
Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 1171,

1222 (1983) ("It is almost as if a majority of the [Supreme] Court [were] bell-bent to seize any available
opportunity to define more expansively the constitutional authority of law enforcement officials."); Cf. Stephen
A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustratedby the Open Fields
Doctrine),48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) ("It is understandable that the judicial branch of government would
want to join with the other two in fighting against the use of illegal drugs.").
10 See Douglas, supranote 1, at 5 n.24.
11 See, e.g.. Statute of Labourers, 23 EDW. 3, cI (1349).
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the breakup of the feudal system.' 2 Thus, the runaway serf became a vagrant and
his wandering and loitering' 3 became a crime.
Over the centuries, the philosophy behind the vagrancy laws shifted from a
means to control labor to embrace the more socially acceptable means to control
crime.14 As a result, vagrancy laws evolved to encompass not only the runaway
serf, but a host of curious accretions: begging, drunkenness, disorderly conduct,
prostitution, lewdness, and narcotics. 5
Despite the apparent clash with American ideals of liberty 6, vagrancy-type

8
laws' were incorporated into the law in the American colonies.
7

The tradition of vagrancy laws in America has also produced a tradition of
abuse.19 These abuses have produced damaging effects on the people of this
nation - including an encroachment on those rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment. As Justice Douglas and other critics of the vagrancy law
concluded, the vagrancy law results in abuse on the streets as law enforcement
officials may arrest anyone merely on the suspicion that they have been involved
in another crime which can not be proved, 20 and to justify arrests for conduct
2
which is not criminal. '
12 C.J. RIBTON-TURNER, A HISTORY OFVAGRANTS AND VAGRANCY AND BEGGARS AND BEGGING 39 (1887).

13 Prohibitions against loitering were incorporated within the vagrancy laws because the concepts overlapped.
See Mark Malone, Note, Homelessness in a Modem Urban Setting, 10 FORDHAM URB.L. J. 749 (1982).
14 Douglas, supra note I at 6. See also District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ("A
vagrant is a probable criminal; and the purpose of the statute is to prevent crimes which may likely flow from
his mode of life."); Ex pane Branch, 137 S.W. 886, 887 (Mo. 1911) ("[A vagrant] is the chrysalis of every
species of criminal.").
'5Douglas, supra note 1; at 6; see also Rollin M. Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGSL.J. 237 (1958).
16 Arthur H. Sherry, Vagrants,Rogues and Vagabonds- Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CAL. L. REV. 557,
558 (1960) ("... centuries later [vagrancy laws] were unhappily spread upon the books of a nation whose legal,
political, and social principles were of a very different order.").
Justice Douglas also alludes to the conflict of vagrancy laws with American idealogies. He was aghast
at the banishment of the "hobo" from American cities by vagrancy laws. After noting that the hobo is glorified
and immortalized by poems and literature, Justice Douglas referred to himself as a fellow hobo--- a term which
he declared "implies an independence, a restless spirit, the quest for a better life, and rebellion against
submission to orthodoxy".
Douglas, supra note 1, at 3.
17 "Vagrancy law"is used as a generic term to describe the various types under consideration in this article.
18 See, e.g., Massachusetts statute of March 26, 1788 [St. 1788, c. 21]. See also State v. Burgess, 123 A. 178
(Me. 1924) (reciting the history of the Maine statute). By 1956, vagrancy was a statutory offense in every state
except West Virginia where it remained a common law offense. See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law And Its
Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 609 (1956). Today, vagrancy is a statutory offense in all fifty states.
19 See generally Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHL L.
REv. 345 (1936); Note, Use Of Vagrancy-Type Laws ForArrest And Detention Of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE
L.J. 1351 (1950). See also infra note 22.
20 See Foote, supra note 18, at 649. ("One cannot escape the conclusion that the administration of vagrancytype laws serves as an escape hatch to avoid the rigidity imposed by real or imagined defects in criminal law

and procedure.").
Justice Douglas tells of his journey to Afghanistan and of a political leader who had campaigned too
vigorously against the church and was prosecuted for sacrilege. Although the political leader was eventually
acquitted of that charge, he was convicted of vagrancy and disorderly conduct. Douglas, supra note I, at 9 n. 45.
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VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS

Vagrancy's Versatility vs. The Constitution
The courts have attempted to remedy abuses of the vagrancy law by
finding these laws a violation of Due Process 22 under the void for vagueness
doctrine. A statute is unconstitutionally vague "which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 23 As a result, a vague
statute "violates the first essential of Due Process of law.' 24 A statute will be
Lord Hewatt expressed his reservation about the vagrancy law in Rex v. Dean:
It would be in the highest degree unfortunate if in any part of the country those who are
responsible for setting in motion the criminal law should entertain, connive at, or coquette with
the idea that in a case where there is not enough evidence to charge the prisoner with an attempt
to commit a crime, the prosecution may, nevertheless, on such insufficient evidence, succeed in
obtaining and upholding a conviction under the Vagrancy Act, 1824.
Id. n. 49.
Another example of judicial denouncement of the vagrancy law is provided in People v. Craig, 91 P. 9971000 (Cal. 1907).
21 Given the staggering number of episodes of abuse since the genesis of the vagrancy law, this Comment will
only list a few such abuses to suggest the tenor of such abuses:
The vagrancy law's most prevalent use was to banish the destitute from our nation's cities which was
102, 142-43
deemed a necessary part of the public policy. See Mayor of New York v. Mimn, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
(1837); see also Foote, supra note 18, at 603. (discussing the results of a study of the administration of
vagrancy-type laws to rid the streets of undesirables through well-publicized drives). This abuse was not curbed
until the early 1900s. See People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930) (banishment from the state prohibited
by public policy); see also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (first recognized the right of
indigents to move freely from state to state).
Another group recognized as bearing the brunt of vagrancy laws were the Puerto Rican migrant
workers. Because the migrant worker hampered the ability of other community members to gain employment,
their presence in some communities produced great discord. As a result, the migrant workers were prosecuted
under vagrancy laws when their only crime was being an International Worker of the World. See 1951 REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMINSSION ON M IGRATING LABOR; see also S. REP. No. 1150, pt. 3, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
The vagrancy law was also used for political persecution. In 1935, California waterfront strikers were
convicted of vagrancy during a police drive against "radicals". The court of appeals reversed, convinced the
strikers were convicted because they were Communists at a time when the Communist Party was lawful in
California. See THE RECORDER, January 24, 1935, pp. 1, 8.
The vagrancy law was also used to suppress unpopular speech. See, e.g., Edelman v. California, 344
U.S. 357, 365-66 (1953) (Black, J. dissenting) (concluding the vagrancy law was used to suppress speech
critical of the police).
Another category of abuse as a result of the vagrancy law is what Professor Maclin calls the "worst
case scenario"; that is, those cases which fall into the ugly abyss of racism. Maclin, supranote, at 1258. The
Supreme Court created a "no evidence rule" under the Due Process clause to attempt to remedy the abuse of the
vagrancy law. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (Five negroes were convicted of vagrancy
because they refused to leave the reading room of the public library.); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)
(prosecuted under vagrancy-type law by sitting at 'white lunch counters' in business establishments); Thompson
v.
City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
22
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
A problem related to the void-for-vagueness doctrine is the overbreadth doctrine. The overbreadth
doctrine comes into effect when conduct that is protected by the constitution is regulated by a statute. See
Comment, Constitutional Law- Arbitrary Enforcement and Overbreadth of Vagrancy Ordinance Violative of the
Due Process Clause, 19 N.Y.L. F. 191, 194-95 (1973). For a recent discussion, see Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983).
23 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
24 id.
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held void-for-vagueness if it fails to provides people of ordinary intelligence the
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that they may act accordingly, 25 or
fails to express explicit standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement.26
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is designed to forbid wholesale legislative
delegation of lawmaking authority to the courts. 27 Courts employ it to ensure and
advance legislative crime definition, universally recognized in this country as the
"first principle of the criminal law". 2 8 Likewise, the goals furthered by
application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine are political accountability in the
29
use of government power and fairness in the administration of justice.
However, the dearth of useful precedent has shown the doctrine's main
thrust is not only being used as a marker in the separation of powers question,
and to ensure notice, 30 but in combination with the real dangers of judicial
innovation--- arbitrary and capricious law enforcement. 3 1 Indeed, of the many
justifications for the vagueness doctrine, the Supreme Court's most recent
enunciation in the vagrancy context proclaims the protection against the "whim
and caprice" of the police to be the paramount concern. 32 The concern for
protection against the abuse of police discretion raised by the Supreme Court has
gained fervor in the lower courts and is repeatedly cited in the evaluation of
33
vagrancy statutes.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine does not appear to be the panacea for
reducing police misconduct. As Justice Frankfurter acknowledged, "[the
vagueness doctrine], in itself, is an indefinite concept". 34 Scholars have

25 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
26 Gravned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; see also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; Papachristou 405 U.S. at 162.
27 See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness. And The ConstructionOf Penal Statutes, 71 VA.L. REV.
189, 189 (1985).
Of course, some interstitial judicial lawmaking is inevitable, as any resolution of statutory ambiguity

involves judicial choice. The void-for-vagueness doctrine is meant to keep individualized decision making to a
minimum and recognizes judicial incompetence in the formulation of the substantive criminal law.
HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 79-80 (1968).
29
Jeffies, supra note 27, at 212.
30 See supra note 26.

28

31 See supra note 27, at 197-99, 217-18. ("[Tlhe individualized adjudication of guilt is an unusually inadequate
check on prosecutorial and police action.").
32 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).

33 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1980); United States ex rel Newsome v.
Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1172-74 (2d Cit. 1974); Waters v. McGuriman, 656 F. Supp. 923,925-27 (E.D. Pa.
1987); People v. Superior Court (Caswell), 758 P.2d 1046, 1050, (Cal. 1988); Coleman v. City of Richmond,
364 S.E.2d 239, 242 (Va. CL App. 1988).
34 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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commented that the difficulty of review often results in decision making which is
35
contextual and impressionistic.
36
Vagrancy law is often criticized as the epitome of inherent vagueness.
Facing the difficulty of defining terms like "vagrant", "loiter", and "prowl"
coupled with the ambiguity in the standard itself, courts have turned to
considerations of social policy and practicality. 37 These concerns have played a
prominent role to help defeat the vagueness challenge due to this nation's
declared war on drugs.38

35 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restriction on the Punishment of Crimes of Status. Crimes
of General Obnoxiousness,Crimes of Displeasuring.Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CIuM. L. BuLL. 205, 22124
(1967).
36
As Professor Sherry predicted:
If [loitering laws] were merely a matter of style, if phraseology alone were at the heart of
the matter, retaining the quaint medieval syntax of old England might be tolerated on grounds of
historical sentiment. Unfortunately, the 14th century [terminology] are not just words for which
modem substitutes stand readily at hand, nor are the statutes in which the vagrant, rogue and
vagabond of today are identified and defined so written that their inadequacies may be cured by
translating their terms into the prose of the mid-twentieth century draftsman.
Sherry, supra note 16, at 557-58.
37 See Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part II, sec. 250.6, at 394, 396-97 (1980) (Official Draft and
Revised Comment) ("Most courts are willing to consider in a void-for-vagueness analysis the need for some
provision and the impossibility of achieving greater precision.").
People v. Guilbert, 472 N.Y.S. 2d 90 (N.Y. Crim. CL 1983), provides an example of the emphasis on social
concerns prevalent in vagrancy cases. Judge Bianchi, sitting at the criminal court for the City of New York
could not escape the social ramifications. After an extensive discussion and analysis suggesting the statute
prohibiting loitering in certain transportation facilities at issue is unconstitutional, he states in his final
paragraphs:
The court must consider the realities of our society and the broad implications of its
ruling. For within the geographical jurisdiction of this county are two of the world's busiest
international airports and innumerable subway, railroad and enclosed bus stations and terminals.

I am impressed that there is indeed a reasonable relationship between the welfare of the public at
large, and the concern and efforts of the legislature to insure the safety of the many patrons who
utilize transportation facilities which often serve as the setting of society's most violent crimes.

Therefore, although the statute is by no stretch of the imagination a monument to
legislative craftsmanship, and is...constitutionally nettlesome, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the defendants have failed to discharge their burden of proving the statutes
constitutional invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id at 94.
The Supreme Court, itself, is not beyond a certain reliance on practical considerations. See Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983X"Impossible standards of clarity are not required."); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 581 (1974) ("There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature of the problems presented,
legislatures simply cannot establish a standard with great precision.").
38 Akron, Ohio, Code Ordinances 138.26 (1989), a version of the modem vagrancy ordinance prohibiting
loitering for the purpose of engaging in drug-related activities, was enacted in 1988 over much disagreement.
Less than five short months after the enactment of Section 138.26, over one hundred fifty individuals had been
charged with violating the ordinance. When the ordinance was first presented for constitutional review, an
Akron Municipal Court began:
Illegal drug use in Akron has increased to an alarming level, and the number of drugrelated arrests have skyrocketed...Much of this increase is believed to be drug related...The
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Although frequently struck down by courts in the 1960-70's on vagueness
grounds, the vagrancy laws have retained surprising vitality with the aid of39both
legislatively and judicially created limitations as to place, scope, or purpose.
A. The Original Vagrant
In Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,40 the Supreme Court reviewed the
language employed in the once common vagrancy law. 4 1 In Papachristou,eight
individuals were42 charged with offenses such as being a "vagabond" or a
"common thief". They were convicted under a vagrancy ordinance. The
ordinance prohibited seemingly innocent behavior such as loafing and habitual
nightwalking. 43 The Court found this type of "large net" cast for offenders void
for vagueness because it encouraged arbitrary arrests and convictions. 44 The
majority explained that because the ordinance criminalized many activities that
were common and innocent by modem standards, the ordinance granted the
police unrestrained discretion to choose which members of society to arrest.45
The Court then condemned the law for permitting arrest on suspicion and for
providing a convenient tool for "harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local
prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their
displeasure. "46

ordinance is a reaction to this crisis. In enacting the ordinance, the Akron City Council, in
Section 3, declared it to be 'an emergency measure ....
City of Akron v. Holley, 557 N.E. 2d 861, 863 (Akron, Ohio Mun. CL 1989).
39 Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W.2d, 562, 566, (Wis. 1989).
40 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
41 For other examples of vagrancy statutes found void-for-vagueness, see, e.g., People v. Belcastro, 190 N.E.
301 (I11.1934) (vagrant defined as those reputed to be habitual criminals); HAW. REv. STAT. 1314-1 (1955)
(Proscriptions were directed against any person "who practices hoopiopio, hoounauna, hoomanamana, anaana,
or pretends to have the power of praying persons to death."); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-991(4) (1956)
(repealed 1978); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-19 (West 1963). For a more complete listing of vagrancy
see Comment, ConstitutionalAttacks on Vagrancy, 20 STAN. L. REv. 782 (1968).
statutes,
42
Papachristou,405 U.S at 158.
43
The loitering statute found void-for-vagueness provided:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers,
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, person wandering or strolling
around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly
persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting
houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served,
persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children
shall be deemed vagrants."
Id. at 156-57 nl (quoting JACKSONVnI.E, FLA., ORDINANcE CODE § 26-57 (1965)).
44
at 163.
45
d. at 163-65.
46 Id. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) and Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87,90 (1965)).
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After Papachristou,the lower courts followed suit and struck down broad
47
vagrancy laws on grounds similar to those expressed in Papachristou.
Consequently, the drafters of the vagrancy laws rallied, as mentioned previously,
by limiting "loitering" or "vagrancy" to a particular place, scope, or illicit
purpose. Moreover, most of these new vagrancy laws carefully delineated the
circumstances in which the activity would be considered criminal.48 In many
courts' view, this approach appears to cure the risk of arbitrary enforcement.
B. Place Limitations
In People v. Bright49, the Court of Appeals of New York addressed a
version of the vagrancy law which confined the activity made criminal to a
particular place.50 New York Penal Law section 240.35(7) stated that one is
guilty of a violation if he "loiters or remains in any transportation facility, or is
found sleeping therein... '"5' A transportation facility is defined as:
any conveyance, premises or place used for or in connection with public
passenger transportation, whether by air, railroad, motor vehicle or any other
method. It includes aircraft, watercraft, railroad cars, buses, and air, boat,
52
railroad and bus terminals and stations and all appurtenances thereto.
The court declared that "loitering" may be prohibited in a specific facility
only if it is one of limited size or knowable boundary.5 3 Under these
circumstances, the court explained, law enforcement officials' discretion in
enforcing the law is limited to the confines of a facility "where illegal activity is
notorious." 54
Although the crime was limited to a "transportation facility", the court
found the statute nonetheless failed to give clear notice to the public "that an
47 See. e.g., Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1974) (Henderson, Nevada, vagrancy ordinance
prohibiting loitering or prowling held void-for-vagueness), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); People
v. Berck, 300 N.E.2d 411, 412, (N.Y. 1973) (provision prohibiting loitering or prowling declared void for
vagueness), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); City of Portland v. White, 495 P.2d 778, 779 (Or. Ct. App.
1972) (meaning of "loiter" and "prowl" is too indefinite); City of Bellevue v. Miller, 536 P.2d 603, 608 (Wash.
1975) (ordinance forbidding loitering or prowling held void-for-vagueness). But see State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d
104, 109 (Fla. 1975) (provision using words "loiter" and "prowl" not void-for-vagueness), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1019 (1975).
48 See supra text accompanying notes 49-101.
49 520 N.E.2d 1355, (N.Y. 1988).
50 For other examples of loitering laws confining the crime to a particular place, see Peters v. Breier, 322
F.Supp. 1171 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (park); People v. Merolla, 172 N.E. 2d 541, (N.Y. 1961) (waterfront facilities);
Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute or Ordinance Forbidding Unauthorized
Persons to Enter Upon or Remain in School Building or Premises ,50 A.L.R.3d 340 (1973).
5' N.Y. PENAL LAW §. 240.35(7) (McKinney 1988.)
52
N.Y. PENAL LAW§. 240.00(2)(McKinney 1988).
53 Bright, 520 N.E. 2d at 1359.
54 id
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activity as innocuous as mere loitering [was] prohibited." 55 Thus, the statute
56
violated Due Process and was void for vagueness.
C. Scope Limitations
In Kolender v. Lawson5 7 , the Supreme Court evaluated a California
vagrancy statute which limited its scope to circumstances warranting alarm for
the public safety.5 8 This statute, similar to the Model Penal Code version,5 9
offers a vagrancy law of the "stop and identify" variety. 6° The Model Penal Code
version limiting its scope to "alarm for the public safety" 61 was adopted for the
same reason as the version of the vagrancy law limited to place - both were
conceived in an effort to cure the wholly standardless reach of older vagrancy
laws. 62 The Model Penal Code has been adopted by most states. The California

statute in Kolender declares guilty every person:
who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without
apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to
account for his presence when requested by any peace officer so to do,
if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a
63
reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification.

55 Id. at 1360-61. The court found the definition too broad, analogizing it to a public street rather than to a
restricted area of public access. The court recognized that many transportation facilities had developed into
"small, indoor cities." let Thus, the statute failed to give unequivocal warning. Id.
56 Id.
17 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
58 Id.
59 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (1980) provides:
A person violates the statute if he or she loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a

manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the
safety of persons or property in the vicinity.
Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm is
warranted is the actor's... refusal to identify himself...
A police officer shall prior to arrest... afford the actor an opportunity to dispel any

alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting to identify himself and explain his
presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this Section if the peace
officer did not comply with the preceding sentence ....
60 For those articles focusing on the "stop and identify" version of the vagrancy law, see generally Leslie V.F.
Silvestrini, Note, Kolender v. Lawson: Fourth and Incites On Fourth Amendment Issues And Supreme Court
Punts, 10 J. CONT'EMP. L 239 (1984); Alan D. Hallock, Note, Stop-and-Identify Statutes After Kolender v.
Lawson: Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 IOWAL. RE. 1057 (1983).
61 See, e.g., State v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43 (Idaho 1990).

62 See Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part II § 250.6 at 383-91, 393-98 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
63 CAL PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970).
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Although the Ninth Circuit 64 found the statute unconstitutional on a variety
66
of grounds 65, the Supreme Court only addressed the identification requirement.
The Court noted that "the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands
of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must
on his way." 67 The Court condemned the statute as a
be permitted to go
6
8
"convenient tool" for abusive or discriminatory law enforcement, which
"entrusts lawmaking to the moment to moment judgement of the policeman on
his beat.' 69 Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that particular section of the
70
statute void for vagueness.
Subsequent cases addressing similar Model Penal Code-based vagrancy
provisions in the lower courts are split as to whether these laws should be
declared void for vagueness. 7' In Watts v. State72, the Supreme Court of Florida
addressed a similar statute declaring it unlawful for any person:
to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for
law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable
and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons
or property in the vicinity.
Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining
whether such alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that
the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer,
refuses to identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself
or any object. Unless flight.. .makes it impracticable, a law
64 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 356 n.4. (1983) (explaining the reasons for accepting the case from
the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
65
66

Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355.

The majority in Kolender v. Lawson stated:
Because we affirm the judgment of the court below on [the question of the vagueness of
the identification requirement]..., we find it unnecessary to decide the other questions raised by
the parties... The remaining issues raised by the parties include whether section 647(e) implicates
Fourth Amendment concerns, whether the individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
his identity when he is detained lawfully under Terry. whether the requirement that an individual
identify himself during a Terry stop violates the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled
testimony, and whether inclusion of the Terry standard as part of a criminal statute creates other
vagueness problems.

Id. at 361-62 n.10 (citations omitted).
67 461 U.S. at 358.

68 Id. at 360 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972)).
69 id.
70 id.

71 For cases holding the identification section constitutional see, e.g., Bell v. State, 313 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1984);
City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W.2d 562, 57 (Wis. 1989).
For cases finding the identification section unconstitutionally void for vagueness: see, e.g., Fields v.
City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1987).; State v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43 (Idaho 1990).
72 463 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1985).
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enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this
section, afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or
immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting
him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct.
No person shall be convicted of an offense under this section if the
law enforcement officer did not comply with this procedure or if it
appears at trial that the explanation given by the person is true and, if
believed by the officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm or
73
immediate concern.
The court distinguished the Florida law 74 from the California statute
reviewed by the Supreme Court, in Kolender noting that failure to identify
oneself was not an element of the crime under the Florida law. 75 Instead, "a
person's identification or refusal to identify is merely a circumstance to consider
in deciding whether the public safety is threatened.' 76 Thus, although the court
intimated that an arrest might hinge on such a failure, 77 the statute did not create a
certainty that the arrest would be based solely on such a failure. 78 In the court's
opinion, the risk of arbitrary police conduct was minimized and the void for
vagueness challenge failed. 79
The Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. BitI80 , opted for a different
interpretation of the identification requirement. The Idaho ordinance 1 , identical
to the statute in Watts, also required the police to dispel any alarm prior to arrest,
but did not specify if a failure to respond would mandate arrest.8 2 The Idaho
Supreme Court ruled that by imposing the requirement for police interrogation,
"albeit . . .in a backhanded manner", the ordinance suffered from the same
constitutional infirmity that the Supreme Court ascribed to the California statute
in the Kolender case.8 3 The court reasoned that although there was no certainty
of arrest, the suspect must still dispel. the officer's alarm.8 4 It feared that a
suspect's failure to respond or an inadequate response (in the officer's opinion)

73 FLA. STAT. § 856.021 (1981).
74

Watts, 463 So.2d at 207.

75 Id.
76 i

77 id.
78 IdL
79 id.
80 State v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43 (Idaho 1990).
81 Id at47.
82 See supra note 59.
83
Bit,798 P.2d at 50.

84 Id

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 3, Art. 7

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26: 3-4

could still serve as a predicate for the arrest.85 Thus, the court declared the statute
86
unconstitutionally vague.
D. Mens Rea Limitations
The version of the contemporary vagrancy law which requires mens rea
appears to be given the most lenient constitutional consideration by the legal
community.87 In People v. Superior Court (Caswell),88 the California Supreme
Court upheld a provision of the California Penal Code which declared every
person guilty of disorderly conduct who commits any of the following acts: "...
loiters in or about any toilet open to the public for the purpose of engaging in or
soliciting any lewd or lascivious or any unlawful act." 89
In assessing the void for vagueness challenge, the California court relied on
the Supreme Court's disposition of cases involving vagrancy laws which included
a scienter requirement. 90 In those cases, the Supreme Court upheld the law at
issue, finding particularly persuasive the idea that the illicit purpose requirement
mitigated the law's vagueness because of the adequacy of notice. 9' Although the
Supreme Court did not address the vagueness question with respect to the danger
of unfettered police discretion, the California court held that police discretion
was restrained in the California statute by the additional place requirement. 92
The court explained that the term "loiter" was not vague because it had
previously defined "loiter" as "lingering in the designated places for the purpose
of committing a crime. '93 It reasoned the requisite "purpose of engaging in or
soliciting any lewd or lascivious or unlawful act" 94 was also not vague because
law enforcement officers could determine this element by considering the several
factors listed in the statute. 95 Accordingly, the court found the statute
constitutional.
85 Id.
86 id.
87 See State v. E.L., 595 So.2d 981, 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (summarily dismissing the ordinance
prohibiting loitering for the purpose of engaging in drug-related activities because the "less specific" Model
Penal Code ordinance had been previously upheld against a vagueness challenge); see also Jordan Bemns, Is
There Something Suspicious About The Constitutionalif of Loitering Laws?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 727 (1989)
("Laws that prohibit loitering with some specified illicit intent are probably the most common type of loitering
laws and almost certainly the safest constitutionally."); cf Douglas, supra note 1, at 11. (suggesting he would
condone an intent requirement).
88 758 P.2d 1046, (Cal. 1988).
89 CAL. PENAL CODE S§ 647(d) (West 1988).
90 Caswell, 758 P.2d at 1049-56.
91 See Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982); see also Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1975); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945) (plurality opinion).
92 Caswell, 758 P.2d at 1049-56.

93 Caswell, 758 P.2d at 1049 (quoting In re Cregler, 363 P.2d 305, 307 (Cal. 1961)).
94 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(d) (West, 1988).

9' Caswell, 758 P.2d at 1049. These factors include whether the actor has repeatedly solicited or committed
similar acts in the same location in the past; whether the officer has some reliable information from an
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96
By contrast, the Virginia appellate court in Coleman v. Ci- of Richmond
ruled the circumstances listed in the ordinance did not save the law from
vagueness. 97 The court reasoned that the circumstances were only "investigative
hints" because police officials were free to disregard them.98 The Virginia court
then concluded that circumstances which merely serve as investigative hints were
not relevant to the constitutional inquiry as they had no force of law. 99 Thus, the
court focused its scrutiny on the "loitering" element of the offense. Because
loitering, itself, is not illegal conduct, the court ruled an officer may arrest "on
mere suspicion of future criminality" and held the law unconstitutional. to

Moreover, the court rejected a claim alleging an overt act would save the
ordinance from vagueness.' 0 ' The court reasoned that because an overt act, by
itself, would prove a charge of attempt or solicitation of some other crime, there
already exists a less restrictive means of addressing the problems confronted by
02
the Richmond ordinance.
Notwithstanding Coleman, °3 the majority of courts have found the new
breed of vagrancy laws--those equipped with limits as to place, scope, or purpose
(especially those which list specific circumstances) - explicit enough to pass
informant as to the suspects's intent; and whether the officer is notified by citizen who have used a restroom that
the suspect was lingering inside while "engaging in suggestive conduct-- not amounting to an actual solicitation
or indecent exposure" but suggestive enough of the person's intent that the officer could find probable cause to
arrest. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(d) (West 1988).
For other court decisions defining an ambiguous term such as "loiter" or "prowl" by requiring a
particular purpose to be manifested, then subsequently defining the purpose by a list of circumstances, see State
v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975) (defines usual by reasonable alarm, then alarm by the Tern, standard), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); see also Bell v. State, 313 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1984) (defines usual by reasonable
alarm,
then alarm by listed circumstances).
96
Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
97 The ordinance at issue in Coleman provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person, within the city limits, to loiter, lurk, remain, or wander
about in public place, or in any place within view of the public or open to the public, in a manner
or under circumstances manifesting the purpose of engaging in prostitution, or of patronizing a
prostitute, or of soliciting for or engaging in any other act which is lewd, lascivious or indecent.
RICHMOND. VA. CODE §§ 20-83, (1986).

The ordinance specified what places are public and also included several circumstances that may be
considered in evaluating whether the prohibited purpose has been manifested. Id.
98 The court alternatively held that if the circumstances listed were sufficient individually to manifest the
prohibited intent, then the law was constitutionally overbroad because it deterred unwritten rights to loiter,
wander, and idle. Coleman. 364 S.E.2d at 243 (citing examples such as a former prostitute who could be
arrested
for window shopping).
99
1d.
100 Id. at 244. The court's concerns are similar to those expressed by the Supreme Court of California in
evaluating the statute at issue in People v. Superior Court (Caswell), 758 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1988).
10 1
Coleman, 364 S.E.2d at 244.
10-lId
103 See State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla. 1975) (The court criticized the Oregon court, stating that it
"failed to apply the judicial principle of construing the wishes of the legislative body in a manner that would
make the legislation constitutionally permissible."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); see also Milwaukee v.
Nelson, 439 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Wis. 1989).
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constitutional muster under the void for vagueness doctrine. Moreover, similar to
the lower court in Kolender and the court in Watts, those courts construing the
Model Penal Code version of the vagrancy law adopt the Terry stop standardl 04
to test which combination of circumstances amount to a violation. In these
courts' opinions, the Terry standard provides a sufficient guarantee against police
abuse.
However, while seemingly explicit, these newly-crafted vagrancy laws
have not been a prophylactic against those abuses t05 declared by the Supreme
Court to be the most important reason for the vagueness doctrine itself.10 6 As the
intractable morass of history demonstrates, the vagrancy law's chimerical
qualities undermine the requirements of probable cause for arrest. This
instability results in unreasonable seizures which place our Fourth Amendment
rights in jeopardy.
The Supreme Court has yet to undertake a Fourth Amendment approach
for review of the vagrancy law.'0 7 The lower courts which have indulged in the
Fourth Amendment analysis are few; the results checkered. Thus, after
reviewing the Fourth Amendment, the remainder of this Comment argues that
our Fourth Amendment rights must be addressed before they are forever
sacrificed in the name of social policy. 108
FOURTH AMENDMENT: FROM BRIGHT LINES To BALANCING...

A. Policy
The Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable seizures places the
citizenry beyond the reach of governmental intrusion unless the government has
good reason to believe that a crime has been or is being committedY°9 The
Fourth Amendment is more than just a negative right against a specific kind of

104
105 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1 (1968); see also infra notes 124-35.
See infra note 187.
106
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
107 Rather, the Court has expressed its ultimate concern with arbitrary police behavior under the void-forvagueness doctrine. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
Other courts have also suggested that much of the criticism of the vagrancy law rests on the postulate
that these laws permit arrest on suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause as mandated by the
Fourth Amendment Indeed, the Court long ago established that a law permitting the government officials to
stop persons on mere suspicion leaves citizens "at the mercy of the officer's whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1979).
108 The hostility to seizures predicated on mere suspicion was the primary motivation for the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,213 (1979).
1
09See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Yet if the individual is no longer to be
sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can 'seize' and
search' him in their discretion, we enter a new regime.").
The Fourth Amendment was applied to the states in Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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government intrusion; rather, it protects a bundle of constitutional values. 110
Among those rights protected in the "street encounter" include, inter alia, the
13
2
right to be let alone,11 the right to personal security," and the right to travel."
Accordingly, if police discretion is not adequately checked, police will have
dictatorial power over the streets resulting in unreasonable seizures, distorting the
fundamental guarantees inherent in our Fourth Amendment promises of
protection.
In the Supreme Court's opinion, not every police-citizen street encounter
constitutes a constitutionally protected seizure.1 4 The Court reasons that such
an approach would cause undue harm to "a wide variety of legitimate law
enforcement practices"."t 5 The standard formulated by the Court to determine if
the police-citizen encounter is a seizure is if the police presence is "unduly
intimidating"."16 Undue intimidation results if, under all the circumstances, a
reasonable person would believe he or she were not free to leave." 7
According to the Court, a police officer's "request" for identification is not
unduly intimidating to the reasonable person; 1 8 a "demand" for identification
110 The commitment

to individual rights, in addition to the Fourth Amendment's mandate against unreasonable
seizures, combine to afford the citizen on the street substantive, as well as procedural protection against
unreasonable police interference. Maclin, supra note 6, at 1260.
111
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1t 2 See U.S. CoNsr. amend IV.
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment states: "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
?ersons... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Id.
13 The Fourth Amendmen's protection of the personal liberty and security of those who move about the streets
is collateral to the right to travel recognized by other provisions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
The constitutional source of the right to travel has been a frequently debated topic. See Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 78-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 14
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
115 Some criticize this apporach not only because it contravenes precedent but because it fails to account for the
illegitimate law enforcement practices it may encourage. See Maclin, supra note 6, at 1284. (it cannot be
demonstrated that "such a rule may be employed without leaving citizens at the mercy of the police."). See also,
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 187-88 (1941). Justice Jackson describes the risk in street encounters:
There is no way in advance to protect against illegal...seizures...They are usually a single
incident, perpetuated by surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely beyond court supervision
and limited only by the judgement and moderation of the officers whose own interests and record
are often at stake. There is no opportunity to appeal for an injunction or to disinterested
intervention. The citizens choice is to either submit to whatever officers undertake or to resist at
risk of arrest or immediate violence.
Id
116 I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,216 (1984).
For a criticism of the undue intimidation standard, see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 789
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Maclin, supra note 6, at 1284.
117 Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 587 (1988). (If the suspect's freedom of movement is already restricted by
factors independent of the police officer's conduct, the Court describes the test as "whether a reasonable person
would feel free to disregard the police.") See also Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
118 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)(holding an interrogation, by itself, does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure).
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However, even if the police officer's presence is unduly intimidating by
demanding identification, these demands may not constitute a "seizure". The
Court recently held that a police officer's demands do not amount to a seizure if
20
the suspect fails to comply with such demands.
is.19

B.

Probable Cause

Only when the police conduct amounts to a constitutionally protected
seizure, will the Court examine if that seizure was justified. Since at least
1925,121 the Court had adhered to the requirement that police officers must have
"probable cause" to believe a crime is being or has been committed before
seizing a suspect.122 Probable cause remained the benchmark to justify a seizure
24
until Terr' v. Ohio, 23 and continues to be the litmus for a formal arrest.
Probable cause means the "known factors and circumstances are such that a
person of reasonable caution would feel a fair degree of confidence that he or she
knows what is going on and can take action in response."' 25 To determine the
existence of probable cause, the Court undertakes a "totality of the
circumstances" 26 approach under a rational basis test. 27 Accordingly, the Court
Indeed, the Court has recently assured us that these on-the-spot encounters do not trouble the average
law-abiding citizen. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,452 (1990).
Likewise, the Court characterizes being following down an alley by a police car as another such
trouble-free encounter. See Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); see also Maclin, supra note 6, at 1260
(suggesting the justices try the experience).
Professor LaFave also concedes this standard is a legal fiction. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 9.3(e), at 477 (2d ed. 1987).
Even more disturbing is that some members of the Court now advance a "no restraint, no seizure"
theory which narrows a constitutionally protected seizure to itntional acquisition of physical control over the
suspect. See California v. Hodari, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991); see also Maclin, supra note 6, at 1281.
119 For a discussion and criticism of the Court's distinction between "request" and "demand", see Marjorie E.
Murphy, Encounters Of A Brief Kind: On Arbitrariness And Police Demands for Identification, ARIZ. ST. L.J.
207,217 (1986).
120 California v. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). Of course, physical contact constitutes a seizure regardless of
whether the suspect yields to the police officer's authority. Id.
121 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
122 Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968).
123 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (The Court allowed police officers, who lacked probable cause, to question and search a
citizen whom the officers suspected might be armed and dangerous.).
24
1 See U.S. CONST., amend. IV. It guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue. but upon
probable cause- supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized,
Id. (emphasis added)
125 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
126 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Prior to expansion of the probable cause doctrine in Gates, the Court applied a two pronged test:
1) basis of knowledge of affiant's allegation of criminal activity occurring, and
2) veracity of the source of the information
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); see also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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has described probable cause as a "fluid concept - turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts-- not readily, or even usefully, reduced
28
to a neat set of legal rules." 1
The quantum of evidence relied upon to make the probable cause
determination need not be evidence that would be admissible at trial; 129 it need
not be circumstances which would evidence criminal activity. Indeed, the
Supreme Court stated that the existence of probable cause does not turn on
whether the
conduct allegedly giving rise to probable cause is "innocent" or
"guilty".' 3° Rather, what is significant is "the degree of suspicion which attaches
to the particular types of noncriminal acts."' 3 1 Although the totality of the
circumstances approach does not "limit the [types of innocent] circumstances
which can be considered relevant", 3 2 recent Supreme Court precedent appears to
33
suggest that the innocent circumstances must be extraordinarily specific. 1
C.

Reasonable Suspicion

After Terry v. Ohio,134 probable cause was no longer the touchstone for
determining when an officer may effect a seizure not amounting to a formal
arrest. 35 Instead, "reasonable suspicion" may now justify a seizure. 136 In Terry v.
Ohio 137 , the Supreme Court held that a police officer may stop an individual
After the Court's decision in Gates, a police officer need only satisfy one prong, if there is a strong
showing of evidence on the other prong. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
127 Cf.supra note 6, at 1333-34 (The evidentiary standard which must be met is not the preponderance, but just
a reasonable explanation.)
128 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); see also Maclin, supra note 6, at 1331-33.
129 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (c)(1).
'30Gates. 462 U.S. at 243-44 n.13.
131lid
132 Yale Kamisar,Gates, "ProbableCause". "Good Faith': ond Beyond, 69 IowA L. REV. 551,570 (1984).
13 3
Cf Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (The facts given by an informant were suspect specific, designated
the particular crime, described where, when and how the alleged crime would occur, and were corroborated by
extensive police surveillance.).
See Maclin. supra note 6, at 1260 (The facts supporting probable cause in Gates were not ordinary,
everyday innocent facts.); see also Kasimar, supra note 132, at 568 (The facts in Gates suggested a definite
nexus between the corroborated details and the alleged crime.).
134 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
t35 Although Terry stands for the proposition that under the reasonable suspicion test, an officer may accost and
stop a person on less than probable cause, the Terry Court actually assumed the officer had the authority to
accost the suspects. See John M. Burkoff, Non-Investigaiory Police Encounters, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
681, 684 (1978) (arguing that Terry never authorized a general power to investigate). Regrettably, subsequent
cases solidify this concept. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
The Supreme Court has established other exceptions to the general rule that an arrest or search must
be based on probable cause to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. These include: searches incident to a valid arrest,
seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, consent searches, searches of containers, inventory
searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which special needs beyond
the normal need for law enforcement make the probable cause requirement impracticable. Project, TWENTIETH
ANNUAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND COURTS OF
APPEALS 1989-1990,79 GEO. L.J. 591,613 (1991).
136
See supranote 133.
137 392 U.S. 1,22-24 (1968).
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reasonably suspected of criminal activity, question him or her briefly, and
perform a limited pat down frisk for weapons. 138 The Court justified ignoring
settled constitutional precedent 139 to accommodate national concern over
burgeoning urban crime. 140 Because a short, investigatory detention is a lesser
invasion than an arrest, and because such seizures serve important government
interests, the Court reasoned that the government interests outweigh the minimal
intrusion into a suspect's privacy. 14 1 The Court believed it was the essence of
142
good police work to adopt this intermediate response.
Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, criticized the Court's policy
decision and predicted that such a blurring of the bright line rule of probable
cause would usher in a "new regime" - one that sanctions police power at the
expense of individual rights. 14 3 Scholarly analyses suggest this prediction was
accurate. 1'
Reasonable suspicion requires a quantum of objective data, less than
necessary to show probable cause. The reasonable suspicion standard is
indicated when a police officer advances specific, articulated reasons to explain
his or her suspicion that a crime has been committed or is imminent. 145 Thus, the
predicate for reasonable suspicion is the police officer's personal observations. 146
Similar to the type of information sufficient for probable cause, the
observations which support an officer's reasonable suspicion may be wholly
innocent acts. 147 The Supreme Court condones innocent circumstances as
grounds for reasonable suspicion because it feels an officer can infer criminal

138 id.

139 As Justice Jackson proclaimed in Brinegar v. United States: "[A police officer] is either taking the initial
steps to arrest, search and seizure, or committing a completely lawless and unjustifiable act."
338 U.S. 160, 187-88 (1941).
140See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 6, at 1310.
141 Terry 392 U.S. at 22-24.
142 id.
14 3
Id. at 26.
144See. e.g., Maclin, supra note 6, at 1310. Professor Maclin states: "The Court's rhetoric is fine, but the Court
does not take its own rhetoric seriously... The Court's Fourth Amendment principles are limited by those who
feel that expansive government power is necessary in light of some social crisis ..... Id.
145 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (1968).
146 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 n.3 (1985) (police observation of overloaded pickup truck
with camper shell commonly used to transport illegal drugs driving in tandem with car and evading police
provided reasonable suspicion to justify stop for suspected drug use); Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (police observation
of suspects pacing nervously and repeatedly looking into store provided reasonable suspicion that a robbery was
contemplated).
147 Several innocent acts, considered together, may amount to reasonable suspicion. See United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989). However, an officer may not base reasonable suspicion on isolated instances of
innocent activity. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam) (no reasonable suspicion when
person arrived on early morning flight from known narcotics source city and glanced repeatedly back to another
passenger).
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acts from conduct which seems innocuous to the untrained observer. 48
Consequently, it affords great deference to the officer's observations and
49
conclusions. 1
Should the police conduct amount to a constitutionally protected seizure,
which the Court finds to be justified by reasonable suspicion, it will apply a
common sense approach to determine whether the police officer's actions during
the seizure were reasonable and whether it was conducted for a legitimate
investigatory purpose.' 50 While the Court's recent doctrine intimates a balancing
test, the law is actually presumed constitutional. Accordingly, the Court weights
the balance to permit intrusive police actions so long as those actions promote
5
effective law enforcement. ' '
Although the scales of justice are tipped in favor of police action, the
Court's inspection of a police officer's actions during a seizure is designed to
ensure police discretion is closely sheparded. The Court recognizes that if police
addressed by
discretion is not constrained in the dynamics of a street encounter
52
arrest.
defacto
a
for
potential
Terry, there is an overwhelming
In fact, the Court has declared a Terry stop to be a "narrowly drawn"
exception to the probable cause requirement.' 53 Indeed, the Court has been
adamant that under no circumstances does police authority allow a search for
evidence.' 54 Moreover, the Court's more recent cases suggest it disapproves of

148 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (officer's special training and experience permit
inferences of criminal activity sufficient to create reasonable suspicion).
149 The Supreme Court's deference extends to the collective knowledge of several law enforcement personnel.
See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)(another police department's reasonable suspicion satisfies
the Fourth Amendment; no personal information required).
The Court has also sanctioned reasonable suspicion based on the information from an unknown
informant when police investigation had extensively corroborated such information. See Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325 (1990) ("close case" for establishing reasonable suspicion).
Furthermore, it appears to have approved the use of statistically calculated personal traits (better
known as stereotypes). See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (upheld reasonable suspicion which
was primarily based on drug courier profile compiled by statistical evidence).
150 In TerrY, the Court stated that a seizure is limited to a brief stop of a suspicious individual in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. 392 U.S. at
5 (1968).
t5' Josephine R. Potuto, A Practictioner'sPrimerto the Fourth Amendmnent, 70 NEB. L. REv. 412 (1991).
15 2 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 6 (1968)(There is no bright line rule for the guidance of police officers in the
field).
When coupled with the reasonable suspicion standard to stop, chronicled police escapades suggest the
Court's constitutional doctrine has not been adequate.
For instance, a tactic employed by a sheriff in Florida was to post highway signs announcing drug
search roadblocks to oncoming motorists. If any motorists slowed down or made a U turn to avoid the search,
the car would be stopped. See Seth Mydans, Powerful Arms of Drug War Arousing Concern ForRights, N.Y.
TMOES, OcL 16, 1989, at Al.
153 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
154 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 n.14 (1983) (search of automobile passenger's compartment
may not include search for evidence).
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police actions which escalate the intensity of police-citizen encounters. 5 5
Furthermore, a citizen may even have the constitutional right to walk away from
1 56
a questioning officer without the risk of arrest.
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND VAGRANCY LAWS

A. The Supreme Court: Laying the Groutuwork
Justice Brennan laid the groundwork for a Fourth Amendment analysis of
15 7
the current vagrancy laws with his concurring opinion in Kolender v. Lawso.
Recall that in Kolender, the majority found the identification section of a Model
Penal Code version of the California vagrancy law void for vagueness. 58 The
majority did not address the other sections of the statute nor did it address any
Fourth Amendment issues.1 59 However, Justice Brennan found not only the
entire statute void for vagueness, but also adopted the opinion of the lower court
which declared the identification section of the statute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures. 60 As Justice Brennan
noted: "We have long recognized that the government may not 'authorize police
conduct which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels
16
which it attaches to such conduct." '
Justice Brennan explained that the identification requirement violated the
Fourth Amendment because it permitted arrest on mere suspicion that another
crime had been committed. 62 Because the lower court had defined the statutory
text at issue 163 (which required the police officer to interrogate the suspect) to be

equivalent to the Terry test of reasonable suspicion, t64 Justice Brennan reasoned
that permitting arrest based upon a suspect's failure to answer the officer's
questions would amount to arrest on the vague suspicion of the crime for which
155 Cf William j. Mertens, The Fourth Amendiment and the Control Of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L.

REF. 551, 608 (1984). In describing Terry and its prodigy, Professor Mertens states: One interpretation of Terry
is "not permitting the intensification of the intrusion when the intensification's most obvious purpose is creation
of pressure to achieve the police goal of consent to search." Id.
l5rSee Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (plurality opinion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); i. at
34 (White, J., concurring).
157 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).

158 Id.
at 361.
159Id.

1601d. at 364 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
161 Id.
at 362 n. 1 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,61 (1968)).
62
1 Justice Brennan found an additional violation of the Constitution's prohibition of unreasonable seizures. He
stated that the identification requirement "compelled" answers because the suspect could be arrested for failing
to answer. Since compelling answers is beyond the scope of Terry, the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 365.
For a more in-depth look at the Fourth Amendment and the right to walk away from the police absent
probable cause, see Hallock, supra note 60, at 1057; Silvestrini, supra note 60, at 239.
163 See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 356 n.5 (only when the circumstances manifest to a reasonable person that the

public safety is endangered).

164 People v. Solomon, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied,415 U.S. 951 (1974).
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the suspect was originally stopped. 65 Thus, probable cause requirement for the
original crime could be circumvented by permitting the police officer to
bootstrap his or her way into probable cause. t66
B. The Lower Courts: Building on the Foundation
The Idaho Supreme Court in State of Idaho v. Bitt167 agreed with Justice
Brennan's analysis and applied it to a comparable Model Penal Code version of
an Idaho vagrancy law. 68 As with the California court in Kolender, the Idaho
majority also accepted a reading of the statutory text authorizing the police
officer to interrogate on "reasonable suspicion" that another crime was being
committed. 169
In contrast to Kolender, however, the vagrancy law at issue in Bitt did not
make failure to identify, or an inadequate identification, an element of the
crime.'7 0 Yet the court reasoned that requiring the police officer to dispel his
alarm prior to an arrest--even with a list of specific circumstances for guidance-was tantamount to conscripting the officer with the authority to define the
crime. 17 1 Thus, although there was no absolute guarantee that an arrest on
suspicion of another crime would occur (such as the case with failure to answer
3 ', the court found that the risk of arrest 173 on suspicion exceeded
in Kolender)'
constitutional limits. 174 Accordingly, although the court conceded that the

165 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 363.
1
66id.
167 State v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43 (Idaho 1990).
1

681d. at47.
169 The Idaho Supreme Court quotes the lower court opinion where Judge Winmill stated:
The... ordinance, although employing different language, utilizes the Terry standard in
defining conduct which authorizes a police officer to request an identification of the suspect and
an explanation of his behavior. If the suspect fails to respond or his response is inadequate, his
suspicious conduct may then serve as a predicate for his arrest, detention, conviction and
punishment. In this way, the...ordinance criminalizes behavior which amounts to nothing more
than the type of suspicious conduct which justifies a Terry stop. By far exceeding the limited
intrusion on individual privacy permitted by the Constitution where an officer observes
suspicious conduct not amounting to probable cause, the ... ordinance clearly violates the
defendant's right under... both the Idaho and the United States Constitutions.
Mdat 49.
i70/d at 50.
17 1 Id (The court states its reasons for finding the statute constitutionally infirm under the Fourth Amendment
is similar to its reasons for finding the statute void for vagueness-- both are a result of a lack of guidelines for
the
ordinance's enforcement.).
17 2 See supra notes 67-70.
173 In order to hold a statute facially unconstitutional, there must be a core of circumstances to which the
ordinance could be unquestionably constitutionally applied. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (majority
opinion). But see Kolender at 370 (White, J., dissenting) (A facial challenge requires finding that ordinance is
unconstitutional under any and all factual circumstances.).
17 4
See State v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43, 50 (Idaho 1990).
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defendant challenging the vagrancy law at issue had a "hard test", it nevertheless
75
declared the statute unconstitutional. 1
The Wisconsin majority in City of Milwaukee v. Nelson' 76 had a different
opinion when faced with an identical (Model Penal Code-patterned) vagrancy
77
law which did not absolutely compel an answer or subject the suspect to arrest.
In contrast to the Idaho majority, this court upheld the statute's constitutionality
against a facial challenge of the Fourth Amendment. 7 8 The court began with an
extensive discussion of the expertise of the Model Penal Code drafters, noting
that the Model Penal Code's version of vagrancy has had nearly universal
acceptance by the states.1 79 Although conceding that even the drafters of the
Model Penal Code were aware of the potential invalidation of such vagrancy
laws because the law could be used as a ruse for authorizing arrest without
probable cause, the court disregarded any suggestion that unscrupulous police
officials may be encouraged to harass persons for reasons other than the
legitimate concerns embodied in the ordinance. 180
The court stated that any law may be subject to abuse' and reasoned that
the danger of arbitrary and capricious police abuse resulting in arrests on
suspicion would be slight because a violation occurs only under circumstances
182 It
that "warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity."'
found those circumstances warranting alarm listed in the statute to establish
"minimal guidelines for arrest which we find to be constitutionally
reasonable."1 83 In addition, the court relied on the part of the statute which
prohibited "loitering" to provide further safeguards against arrests for other
crimes without probable cause.'S4 The court explained that because "loitering" is
the proscribed conduct, the statute is already violated at the time of the police
85
intrusion.
The court repeatedly noted with assurance the statutory requirement that a
police officer must allow the suspect to dispel the alarm prior to the arrest as a
175 id

176 439 N.W.2d 562, (Wis. 1989).
177d. at 563 n. 1.
178 Defendant asserted four arguments; all were rejected by the court: (1) the law is without a statutory criminal
counterpart requiring probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed for a warrantless arrest; (2) it is
an unreasonable seizure to arrest without a warrant for a minor offense only punishable by a fine; (3) the law is
without statutory guidelines to govern law enforcement officials as to when to arrest or issue a written citation;
(4) the law is without a probable cause requirement. Milwaukee, 439 N.W.2d at 566-73.
179 Id at 565.

180 Id at 572.
181 Id. at 574. ("We have other laws designed to curb and punish such abuses as the many civil rights suits
amply demonstrate.") (Day, J. concurring).
182 Id at 567.
183 Id.

'84 Id. at 570, 149 Wisc. 2d at 442.
1851d
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bulwark against arbitrary arrest.' 8 6 After discussing the important social
objectives of the ordinance, and reminding the parties that the statute would be
presumed constitutional, the court held that the defendant had failed to meet his
burden beyond a reasonable doubt. 187
C. The Future: Breachingthe Wall?
Although Justice Brennan laid the groundwork in his Fourth Amendment
review of the Model Penal Code version of the vagrancy law, which appears to
have taken hold in some lower courts, 88 it is still doubtful whether this
foundation will survive.
At least one court has already expressed its reservations as to whether a
statute which defines a crime can even violate the Fourth Amendment. 89 There
is no specific precedent for such a proposition, nor do traditional Fourth
Amendment claims support such a notion. Rather, those claims have been
directed toward police conduct, not the definition of a crime as set out by
statute. 190
However, there is no precedent against such a channel of Fourth
Amendment review.' 9 ' Justice Brennan feels confident that early court
intimations guarantee a statutory analysis under the Fourth Amendment.t92 From
the case-by-case basis for which allegations of unreasonable seizures have been
resolved in the past, it would seem to follow that a statute authorizing such
93
seizures would also offend the Constitution.
Should a court agree that a statute can even violate the Fourth Amendment,
it still has other options. It may still reject the allegation that the vagrancy statute
at issue results in unreasonable seizures. Similar to the reasoning of the
Milwaukee court, a court may assert that the risk of arrest without probable cause
is
is dispelled, or at least minimized, because "loitering" is the conduct which
1 94
action.
police
to
prior
committed
been
has
crime
the
Therefore,
prohibited.

186See id. at 571-72, (If the officer does not afford the actor an opportunity to dispel any alarm, the actor
cannot be convicted of violating the ordinance. If an explanation is given, the trier of fact ultimately decides if
the explanation was reasonable under the circumstances.).
187 Id.at 563.
188 See, e.g., State v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43 (Idaho 1990); City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W.2d 562, (Wis.
1989).
'89 Bitt, 798 P.2d at 50-55 (Bakes, C.J., dissenting).
190See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 367 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
191 id. at 367 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring).

1921d
"
193 Id. at 363 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
194 See City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W.2d 562, (Wis. 1989); see also State v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43 (Idaho
1990) (Bates, C.J., dissenting).
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This rhetoric is disturbing in theory as well as in practice. First, similar to
the Milwaukee court, in order to discern whether a vagrancy statute has met the
vagueness challenge, the majority of courts engage in a serpentine semantic
marathon. Those courts have equated the first element of the crime ("loitering
under circumstances not usual to law abiding individuals") with the second
element ("under circumstances that warrant alarm").1 95 Essentially, the courts
have used the second element - "under circumstances that warrant alarm" - to
define the first. For a court to then assert it has relied on the first element to
96
temper police misconduct is inconsistent and illogical. 1
Second, even if a court should retain the facade of defining the vagrancy
law by two separate elements, distinguishing the elements is practically
impossible. 9 7 This problem should not be surprising, since emphasizing the
"loitering" aspect of the vagrancy statute is the reason the statutes were originally
declared void for vagueness. 98
However, a court may rule that the specific circumstances listed in the
statute, in and of themselves, save the vagrancy law from arbitrary application.
In the context of the Model Penal Code "stop and identify" vagrancy statutes,
those courts addressing the claim of vagueness have simply read the
The very fact these vagrancy laws are amenable to judicial interpretation should cause concern. The Court's
development of the void-for-vagueness doctrine stems from a rejection of common law crime creation which
results when statutory construction degenerates into fact-specific, case by case criminalization. Consequently,
individualized crime making by judicial fiat allows "agencies of law enforcement to exploit uncertainty
according to their own agendas of social control." See Jeffries, Jr., supra note 27, at 223 ("Where judges stand
ready to create new crimes [by attributing new meanings to preexisting rubrics of common law criminalization],
and prosecutors will bring them new crimes to create.").
police
19 5 See Bell v. State, 313 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1984) (The court reasoned that "the offense of loitering is committed
only when the actor engages in conduct 'not usual for law abiding individuals' which created 'a reasonable alarm
or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity'." Rejecting the argument that "usual"
is vague, the court responded that the phrase is made clear by the clause which provides that the suspect's
conduct would have to alarm a reasonable person.); see also City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W.2d 562,
(Wis. 1989); State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 109 (Fla. 1975).
Courts have used the same tautological approach in their construction of the vagrancy law requiring
mens rea. See. e.g., People v. Superior Court (Caswell), 758 P.2d 1046, (Cal. 1988)(Loitering is made clear by
"purpose" to engage in another crime. "Purpose" is then defined by the list of circumstances.).
196
Milwaukee, 439 N.W.2d at 567, 572, (1989); Bin, 798 P.2d at 43.
197
See D.A. v. State, 471 So. 2d 147, 150-152 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1985).
The court stated the first element- "loitering in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for lawabiding individuals"- means conduct which just falls short of actual commission or attempted commission of a
substantive crime. In explaining the second element of "those circumstances that would justify reasonable
alarm", the court stated that this means conduct which points toward the commission or attempted commission
of a crime which would amount to an imminent threat to public safety.
Id.
198
See supra notes 40-48.
The courts are concerned (when evaluating the vagrancy law under the void-for-vagueness doctrine)
that "loitering" is not, by itself, illegal conduct. Therefore, an officer may arrest on mere suspicion of future
criminal activity. Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 244 (Va. App. 1988); State v. Ecker, 311 So.
2d 104, 107-08, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975) (relying on Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) and Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965)); Hallock, supra note 60, at 1062
(concluding that the statute "must avoid making loitering or vagrancy an element of the offense.").
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circumstances as "reasonable suspicion" that another crime is being committed,
disregarding any further specificity as impractical.' 99 Likewise, with the
vagrancy laws requiring scienter, most courts have also refused to examine the
risk of abusive enforcement by the ad hoc balancing of a list of discretionary
circumstances. 2°° A court addressing the problem of arbitrary police conduct
inherent in those circumstances would probably also becloud the Fourth
20
Amendment issue with a litany of grave social consequences. '
Yet, it is ultimately the judgment of the police officer on the street as to
what circumstances to apply. 20 2 Obviously, police discretion can never be
entirely eliminated. But it is also clear that the problem can be exacerbated by
accepting statutes, such as the vagrancy laws, "which embrace open-ended
203
progressivity in the criminal law", producing arbitrary law enforcement.
For instance, the current Fourth Amendment analysis of either probable
cause or reasonable suspicion is a "balancing of the circumstances" act. 204 With a
certain, definition of a crime in advance, an officer may use his or her reasoned
judgment to assess a range of circumstances to see if that crime has been
committed.
The problem with vagrancy is that the courts are reading those
circumstances listed in the statute (which allow the law to pass the vagueness
challenge) as "reasonable suspicion". 20 5 This approach defines the crime by the
Supreme Court's present judicial construction of the Fourth Amendment.
This approach is not only impractical, it is impossible.20 6 The Supreme
Court, itself, has conceded the Fourth Amendment standard for assessing
unreasonable seizures is a "fluid concept" and "not usefully reduced to legal
rules. '20 7 Therefore, even if a court should read those circumstances as
discretionary (as with those vagrancy statutes requiring an illicit intent), the peril
199 See supra text accompanying notes 57-85.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 86-106.
201 See, e.g., supra note 37.

202 Cf United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
203 Jeffries, supra note 27, at 223.
20 4
See supra text accompanying notes 108-150.
205 See, e.g., D.A. v. State, 471 So. 2d 147 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1985).
The court cautioned other courts to zealously protect against the unconstitutional application of the
vagrancy law because it plainly reaches the outer limits of the constitution. The court was particularly worried
about those courts who attempt to use the list of circumstances as probable cause to justify a formal arrest ad to
justify a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id at 152.
206 Professor Maclin argues that the present Supreme Court pronouncements on the Fourth Amendment with
respect to unreasonable seizures make it impossible to distinguish between probable cause and reasonable
suspicion.
Maclin, supra note 6, at 1333-34.
20
7 See id.(claiming that the standard is not even useful to distinguish between probable cause and reasonable
suspicion).
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of moment-to-moment crime definition is the same. Consequently, regardless of
the construction given a vagrancy statute, crime definition is not left to the
legislature, it is left to the patrol officer on the street.
As the abuses throughout history have grafted upon the American
conscience since the genesis of the vagrancy law, crime definition as a tool of the
20 8
police officer has resulted in arrests on suspicion and just plain discrimination.
Police officers are trained to be suspicious. They operate under "settings of
secrecy and informality, often perpetuated by a sense of emergency, rarely
constrained by self-conscious generalization of standards." 20 9 Moreover, studies
suggest police abuse often results from lack of proper training and guidance in
assessing circumstances, isolation from the community, 2 10 and prejudices
developed on the force. These studies further support the proposition that the
power to define the criminal law, such as is granted with the vagrancy law's
discretionary specification of circumstances, should not be left to those who
enforce it.2t1
Aggravating the abuse brought on by this random balancing of
constitutional standards is the fact that vagrancy is a misdemeanor. 21 2 Minor
crimes such as vagrancy law violations rarely appear in state or regional

208 See supra notes 20-21. The two most recent vagrancy cases to reach the Supreme Court even show that such
laws engender hidden bias and discrimination. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)
(vagrancy prosecution of two white women and two black men riding together down the town's main street);
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (Edward Lawson is a black man of unconventional appearance whose
avocation is walking, usually late at night, and often in wealthy and predominately white residential areas. He
had been stopped at least 15 times on such occasions before the statute was declared unconstitutional.).
Studies provide further support for the suggestion that if given wide discretion, police will abuse it.
See. e.g.. Michael K. Brown, Working the Street, Police Discretion and the Dilemmas of Reform 163-66 (1981)
(study concluding that police are more likely to use aggressive patrol tactics against minorities); cf. Herman
Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control Of The Police). 58 J. CRiM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE. Sci. 433, 453 N. 146 (1967) (discussing how the police even welcome resistance during investigatory
detentions); cf.Kenneth C. Davis, POLICE DISCREnON 18 (1975)(describing how Chicago police officers divided
society into two classes of people: the kinky (criminal) class and the law-abiding class); Aldert Vrij & Frans W.
Winkel, Crosscultural Police-Citizen Interactions: The Influence of Race, Beliefs, and Nonverbal
Communication on Impression Formation, 22 J.OF APPLIED PsycHOL. 1546 (1992) ("Several studies done in
both the United States and Europe suggest that police officers assess black citizens more negatively than they do
white citizens.").
209 Maclin, supra note 6, at 1317.
2
toSee Brown, supra note 208, at163-66. (study concluding that when minorities are found outside a minority
neighborhood, their race may arouse a police officer's suspicion, even if their actions would warrant no alarm in
a minority neighborhood.); see also Berns, supra note 87, at 730 (cautioning courts to scrutinize police conduct
under the modem vagrancy laws because a person's behavior that might not be objectionable in one community
may arouse suspicion in another).
211 The list of circumstances, themselves, should cause concern. For instance, prior crimes and bad acts are not
far from the original "habitual criminal" found unconstitutional not so long ago. Of course, most courts get
around these concerns by declaring the circumstances discretionary or by simply stating they will "wait another
day". See, e.g., City of Akron v. Holley, 557 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1989). But see Coleman v. City of
Richmond, 364 S.E. 2d 239 (Va. CL App. 1988).
212 See City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 439 N.W. 2d 562, (Wis. 1989). (rejecting the claim that it was a Fourth
Amendment violation for police to seize a suspect for minor crimes). The Supreme Court has not yet decided
this issue.
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reporters, and if reported, seldom reach the higher courts.21 3 The resulting abuse
is especially acute concerning unreasonable seizures not amounting to an
arrest.2 14 As one critic of the vagrancy law explained: "[Because] minor offenses
are seldom reviewed by higher courts, the actual limits of the vagrancy law are
not set in the statute, but by practices of the police."21 5 Furthermore, even if there
is an arrest, the suspect's legal vindication of his right in court does not save him
from all that goes with it: "new acquaintances among jailers, lawyers, prisoners,
and bail-bondsmen, firsthand knowledge of local jail conditions, a "search
incident to an arrest", and the expense of defending against a possible
21 6
prosecution."
Should a court conclude the list of circumstances are indeed inherently
ambiguous, it should strike down both the Model Penal Code "stop and identify"
version and those vagrancy statutes requiring an illicit intent, such as loitering for
21 7
the purpose of engaging in drug activities.
However, it seems unlikely any court at the present time would find a
vagrancy law requiring scienter unconstitutional. Regrettably, scholars and
courts alike seem to disregard scienter, assuming it will not result in unfettered
police discretion because a scienterelement would be less vague than the Model
Penal Code version.2 18 The only court to yet address the issue came to this
219
conclusion.
Social concerns apparently have an overriding influence on many courts
when examining the modern vagrancy law under the second prong of the void for
vagueness doctrine or under the Fourth Amendment. 220 Give this country's war
on drugs, which appears to be one of the vagrancy law's objectives, a court can
213 In 1956, the FBI Uniform Crime Reports concluded that arrest on suspicion is common in this country.
Those arrested on suspicion and released without prosecution ran at the rate of 280.4 people per 100,000
inhabitants; and the total of persons arrested either for a specific offense or for suspicion alone, and released
without being held for prosecution, was at the rate of 666.7 per 100,000 inhabitants. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS No. 1,Semiann. Bull. 65 (1957). The total figure for arrests on suspicion in 1958 was 96,740. Id. at 93
(1958).
214 One black male expressed the resentment of minorities to abusive police tactics: "When they stop
everybody, they say, well, they haven't seen you around, you know, they want to get to know your name, and all
this. I can see them stopping you one time, but the same police stopping you every other day, and asking you
the same old question." PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TASK
FORCE REPORT: TIE POLICE 184 (1967).
215 Foote, supra note 18, at 608.

216 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)- but see City of Milwaukee v. Nelson,
439 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. 1989).
217 The Model Penal Code puts it bluntly: "if this provision is unconstitutional.., then it seems likely that no
general provision against loitering can be drafted to survive constitutional review .. "
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES Part n § 250, 6, at 396-97 (Official Drat and Revised Comments
1985).
See supra note 86.
See State v. E.L., 595 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1992).

2 18
2 19

22 0

See supranote 37-38.
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salve its conscience that it is doing the right thing. 221 If still in doubt, a court may
resort to inserting an "overt act" requirement into the statute.222 Yet an illicit
purpose requirement will be likely only to cure the statute with respect to notice
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 223 Moreover, any "overt act" does not
specify what act or where it may take place to give police officials guidance
about what constitutes "loitering". The very breadth of circumstances in which
this type of vagrancy law may be invoked suggests a broad opportunity for abuse.
The version of the vagrancy law which prohibits loitering in a particular
place would, and should, probably withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
Because this type of vagrancy law restricts any presence in a particularly
described place, police judgement is limited to ascertaining the correct place.
There is no balancing of circumstances to ascertain what conduct, if any,
manifests the "illegal purpose" or the "alarm for the public safety" (both of which
224
have been read by courts to describe the "loitering").
In any event, it appears clear that the issue will not be settled until the
Supreme Court is presented with a non-vague vagrancy statute. Until then, it will
reserve comment on whether a vagrancy statute can amount to a Fourth
225
Amendment violation.
CONCLUSION
It is beyond doubt that combating our nation's war on drugs is a noble
effort. To many, vagrancy law is an invaluable tool in this war. However, others
believe our government needs to develop better ways to combat the epidemic of
crime that plagues our nation.

221 Moreover, courts seem more ready to uphold the vagrancy law requiring the suspect to harbor an illicit
purpose because of the law's apparent moral condemnation. See, e.g., State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
222 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Holley, 557 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio Mun. CL 1989).
223 Supreme Court precedent addressing vagrancy laws with scienter requirements under the void for vagueness
doctrine have upheld them primarily on notice grounds. See supra note 89. It does appear that the Supreme
Court will presume such laws are constitutional. Cf D.V. v. Juvenile Department, 434 U.S. 914 (1977)
(summary dismissal of the case affirmed on the merits an Oregon Supreme Court decision upholding a
challenged statute on void-for-vagueness grounds).
224 However, these laws may have other constitutional concerns. See Berns, supra note 87, at 731.
225 A related issue is the degree of risk of unconstitutional applications that will amount to a violation. Relying
on Justice White's dissenting opinion in Kolender, Chief Justice Bakes, in his dissenting opinion in Idaho v.
Bitt, found that a vagrancy ordinance only amounts to a violation of the Fourth Amendment if, under any and al
factual circumstances, it would be unconstitutionally applied. He asserted that, "The court should consider any
factual variant under which the statute might be applied which might compose a constitutional application." 798
P.2d 43, 51 (Idaho 1990) (Bakes, C.J., dissenting).
But, the majority in Kolender, although in dicta, responded to Justice White's opinion by citing past
precedent which permitted challenges under what the court considered to be analogous cases (especially for
those cases assessing statutes with criminal penalties) even when the statute could conceivably have had some
valid application. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983).
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However, even the Supreme Court's most recent review of the vagrancy
law proclaimed that "as weighty as this concern is ....
it cannot justify legislation
that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards." 226 Likewise, Justice
Douglas, in his criticism of the original vagrancy laws, warned of the abuse of
government power for noble causes - of those measures "designed to increase
our security in a troubled world", but measures determined to erode our
227
constitutional freedoms.
We need not speculate on the destruction of our Fourth Amendment
freedoms produced by the vagrancy law. 2 28 The deleterious effect that the
vagrancy law has had on our freedoms should be recognized and reexamined
under the Fourth Amendment's promises against unreasonable seizures. It should
229
not pass constitutional scrutiny merely through force of age.
Holding a version of the modern vagrancy law unconstitutional would not
result in a blanket restriction on needed police activities. There are many ways to
investigate without interfering with liberty or personal security. 230 For instance,
police need not use the Model Penal Code version of vagrancy to stop a suspect
when a Terry stop would be sufficient. Moreover, police have access to existing
laws against attempt and conspiracy, not to mention solicitation. It is hard to
believe that allowing vagrancy would leave a significant gap in the law since
attempt, conspiracy, and solitation also prevent the fruitation of criminal activity
by giving law enforcement officers a tool to allow arrest and conviction on the
basis of a prediction that criminal activity is imminent.2 3 1 Furthermore, there is
no evidence that police are winning the war effort by strengthening traditional

2 26

Kolender, 461 U.S. 352 at 354 (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)).
227 Douglas, supra note 1, at 13. Justice Douglas describes those loyalty procedures and investigations for
federal and state employees after our second world war. He explains:
We sat by and watched the parade of branded people march into oblivion... We salved our
consciences by saying that no one has the right to work for the government, and from that
premise found power in the government to put the scarlet letter "S"on the foreheads of thousands
of our people.
Id.
Justice Douglas also explained that the same justification was given for holding people incommunicado and
for
allowing
coerced confessions to be used in evidence. Id. at 11.
2 28
See supra notes 20-21.
229 The American version of the vagrancy law is even different from its historical origins which placed
exclusive emphasis on conduct. See, e.g., Vagrancy Act of 1824, 5 Gao. 4, ch. 83 (making it a crime to wander
ad enter another's property without giving a good account of oneself; loiter and possess a tool for the purpose
of breaking and entering another's property).
230See Maclin, supra note 6, at 1308.
231 In attempt law, an act beyond mere preparation is required; in conspiracy and solicitation, the
communication of the intent to commit a proscribed act is deemed to be a reliable predictor of future harm.
Vagrancy laws, in contrast, allow a prediction of a person's ultimate future conduct merely from the fact that he
or she is "loitering or prowling". This difficulty is exacerbated when a list of circumstances is meant to provide
guidance as to what is "loitering" such as those vagrancy laws requiring an illegal intent or those which require
an alarm for the public safety. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTN W. Scor,JR., CRIMNAL LAw 488 (2d ed. 1986).
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law enforcement techniques. It appears that the drug problem is a social disease
2 32
beyond police resources and expertise to address alone.
In a society of multiplying crime, it is undoubtably difficult to feel concern
for those arrested on "mere suspicion" of a crime, but later found to be guilty.
Yet we must recall that "the measure of the health of our legal system is the
justice dispensed at all levels." 233 Indeed, history has shown "that the safeguards
of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice
people." 234 Besides, as Justice Douglas and others warn, the "list of casualties of
the vagrancy law will continue. . . everyone is a potential target."2 35 "Vagrancy
and arrest on suspicion are not distant, remote, speculative; they are just around
' 236
the comer in many of our communities.
Thus, while police accosting and chasing criminals produce little sympathy
for those unsavory characters, police accosting and chasing children do not.
THE TIME: 1993
THE PLACE: Anytown, USA
SCENE ONE: Children are playing hide and seek about one block from home.
One child crouches in the bushes near the expressway exit. "Ready or not, here I
-"
She is seized and arrested for vagrancy. The police explain that the
237
neighborhood is a high crime area.

232 See, e.g.. Maclin, supra note 6, at 1333-34 (When law enforcement officials concede that conventional
police methods will not deter drug abuse, society is naive to believe that greater investigatory powers for the
police will solve the drug crisis.); Mathea Falco, The Bush Drug Plan:Nothing New, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1989,
at A19 (criticizing the Bush Administration's new drug plan because the "new" strategy would continue to
concentrate primarily on law enforcement, despite overwhelming evidence accumulated during the past eight
years of the minimal .impact of law enforcement on drug abuse and drug trafficking.); President's"Victory Over
Drugs"Is Decades Away, Officials Say, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1989, § 1, at 1; After Studying for War on Drugs.
Bennett Wants More Troops, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1989, § 4, at 5. This article noted that:
Some law-enforcement professionals grouse that [Director of National Drug Control Policy]
Bennett is too reliant on law-and-order prescriptions for a problem with deep social and
economic roots. "I know it would be heresy for a cop to say this, but we need to quadruple our
effort on the demand side," said Sheriff Clarence W. Dupnik of Pima County, Ariz .... But such
programs will get short shrift, he added, because "people are in a 'lock 'em up and throw the key
away' mood, and it is that emotion that is fueling our national policy."
Id.
233 Douglas, supra note 1, at 14.
234 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
235 Cf. Maclin, supranote 6, at 1336.
236 Douglas, supra note 1, at 14.
237 This fact pattern was taken from a recent vagrancy case, see L.S. v. State, 449 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
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Professor Amsterdam, a respected authority on the Fourth Amendment
stated, "The formulation of our Fourth Amendment principles are ultimately a
238
value judgment about the type of society in which we wish to live. ,,
Is this the way we want to live?
T. LEIGH ANENSON

238 Anthony G. Amsterdam, PerspectivesOn The Fourth Amendnent, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353 (1974).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 3, Art. 7

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss3/7

32

